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Are CEE states successful as venture capitalists? 
 
Judit Karsai 
 
Abstract 
 
The entire venture capital sector of Central and Eastern Europe is characterised by the 
increased weight of state resources. The strengthening of public activities is mainly due to the 
new type of equity schemes introduced in the European Union’s 2007 to 2013 programming 
period, which allowed the countries in the region to use part of the Structural Funds to 
develop their venture capital sector. More than 60 venture capital funds undertook to invest 
more than EUR one billion by the end of 2015, by raising one third of the funds from private 
investors. The paper examines how successful the CEE EU Member States, with a relatively 
less developed venture capital industry, were in using government equity schemes based on 
market cooperation between the state and market actors. Since, due to the shortness of the 
time elapsed since launching these schemes, the success of the companies financed by such 
hybrid venture capital funds cannot be assessed, this paper primarily aims to analyse 
whether the region was able to utilise the past lessons from government equity schemes in 
countries with a more developed venture capital industry. Similarly to the equity programs 
applied in the West, the government venture capital programs in the region are also 
characterised by the short time frame, the mass of administrative requirements tying the 
hands of investors, the small fund size, which prevents efficient operation, and the limited 
participation of institutional investors amongst private investors. Compared to developed 
countries, the unjustified level of benefits to and non-transparent selection of private fund 
managers and the immaturity of the investment proposals constitute disadvantages in the 
region. However, the greatest risk of public equity schemes, i.e. the crowding out effect on 
private investors, is missing in the CEE region due to the lack of market investors.  
 
Keywords: venture capital, government venture capital, government equity schemes, SME 
finance, Central and Eastern Europe. 
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Milyen kockázati tőkés a közép-kelet-európai állam? 
 
Karsai Judit 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Az állami források megnövekedett súlya az egész közép-kelet-európai régió kockázatitőke-
ágazatára jellemző. Az állami szerepvállalás felpörgése főként az Európai Unió 2007–2013-as 
tervezési időszakában bevezetett új típusú tőkebefektetési konstrukcióknak köszönhető, 
amelyek lehetővé tették, hogy a régió országai a strukturális alapok egy részét kockázatitőke-
ágazatuk fejlesztésére fordíthassák. A régióban több mint 60 kockázatitőke-alap több mint 1 
milliárd euró összegű tőke befektetését vállalta 2015 végéig, mégpedig úgy, hogy a tőke 
egyharmadát privát befektetőktől gyűjti össze. A tanulmány azt vizsgálja, hogy a relatíve 
fejletlenebb kockázatitőke-iparral rendelkező közép-kelet-európai uniós országok mennyire 
sikeresen tudták alkalmazni az állam és az üzleti szféra piaci együttműködésén alapuló 
kormányzati tőkeprogramokat. Mivel e hibrid kockázatitőke-alapok által finanszírozott cégek 
eredményessége a programok indulása óta eltelt idő rövidsége miatt még nem ítélhető meg, a 
tanulmány elsősorban azt elemzi, hogy a térségben sikerült-e hasznosítani a fejlettebb 
kockázatitőke-ágazattal rendelkező országok állami tőkeprogramjainak korábbi 
tapasztalatait. A nyugaton alkalmazott tőkeprogramokhoz hasonlóan a régióbeli 
konstrukciókra is jellemző a rendelkezésre álló idő rövidsége, a befektetők kezét megkötő 
adminisztratív előírások sokasága, a gazdaságos működést akadályozó kis alapméret, 
valamint a privát befektetők közül az intézményi befektetők korlátozott részvétele. A fejlett 
országokhoz képest a régióban hátrányt jelent a privát alapkezelők indokolatlan mértékű 
kedvezményezése és nem transzparens kiválasztása, továbbá a befektetési ajánlatok 
éretlensége. Ugyanakkor az állami tőkeprogramok egyik legnagyobb veszélye — a privát 
befektetőket kiszorító hatás — a közép-kelet-európai régióban nem merül fel a piaci 
befektetők hiánya következtében.  
 
Tárgyszavak: kockázati tőke, kormányzati kockázati tőke, állami tőkeprogramok, KKV 
finanszírozás, Közép-Kelet-Európa 
 
JEL kód: G23, G24, G28, M13 
 
Köszönetnyilvánítás: A cikk az OTKA K105581 számú pályázat támogatásával készült.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Venture capital has an important role to play both in promoting innovation and facilitating 
access to financing for small and medium size companies. Considering that market funds 
flowing into the venture capital sector have dropped as a result of the 2008 economic crisis, 
the importance of government participation in the capital supply of venture capital funds has 
increased in the EU as a whole and in particular in the Central Eastern European countries1. 
The objective of these schemes was to support the financing of technologically advanced 
start-ups and early stage companies with great growth potential but no access to financing; at 
the same time, governments expected the less developed regions to catch up and new jobs to 
be created, and intended to promote the development of the venture capital sector itself in 
this way.  
This paper restricts itself to examine only venture capital related public action where the 
government acts an investor in the capital supply of the venture capital market. It intends to 
contribute to the ongoing international debate (Colombo et al., 2014; Cumming et al., 2014; 
Leleux et al., 1998; Lerner 2002, 2009, 2010; Meyer, 2007; Murray et al., 2012) by 
presenting the experiences gained in the Central Eastern European region. It looks to answer 
the question of how successful the use of EU funds for venture capital purposes was in the 
Central Eastern European region, with a less developed venture capital market to begin with, 
and to what extent the lessons learned from the earlier public equity schemes in countries 
with more advanced venture capital sector could be exploited.  
 As regards methodology, this paper uses two approaches. On the one hand, and as an 
innovation, it complies a database on the fund volumes managed by hybrid venture capital 
funds in the region, on the basis of the information published by the competent European 
Union bodies, the national managing authorities, the managers of holding and venture 
capital funds, and the European and national venture capital associations and advisory 
bodies. In addition, it looks into the academic and business publications on the venture 
capital sector in the Central Eastern European region, more precisely on government 
involvement in venture capital schemes. Consultations with researchers specialised in this 
topic and interviews prepared with the managers of the affected holding and venture capital 
funds enabled supplementation and verification of the information acquired from secondary 
sources. Since, in practice, the completion deadline for venture capital investment 
                                                        
1 This study considers the following EU Member States as belonging into the CEE region ("the 
region"): Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia.  
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implemented from EU funds between 2007 and 2013 is December 2015, this research, closed 
in the summer of 2015, could not yet assess the effect of public equity schemes on 
enterprises.  
This paper first presents the techniques the Government uses in participating in funding 
the venture capital market. It next outlines the pre-2007 background to equity schemes 
based on public-private cooperation in the region, then it examines government equity 
schemes launched using EU funds in the region in the 2007-2013 period, with detailed focus 
on the development of factors in the region that determined the success of equity schemes in 
countries with developed capital markets. The analysis is completed by summarising the 
lessons of public venture capital schemes in the CEE region. 
 
FORMS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE VENTURE CAPITAL MARKET 
 
Government funding gave an impetus to the development of the venture capital industry in 
numerous countries (Murray, 2007; Cumming, 2009, Wilson and Silva 2013). The question 
is, however, how successful the operation of public equity schemes in the CEE countries, with 
a less developed venture capital sector, can be, in view of the traditionally more sizeable state 
and the more expressly paternalistic relations between the state and economic actors. For 
inappropriately planned government equity schemes the lack of public venture capital 
investors' expertise, investment strategies influenced by political interests, and the less 
effective participation in raising up and mentoring the financed companies can cause 
problems. All these can even lead to crowding out or substitution of private market actors in 
the venture capital market (Brander et al., 2008; Cumming et al., 2014; Armour and 
Cumming, 2006; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2006). 
There are two basic forms of public participation in funding the venture capital market. 
The direct solution is to establish state-owned venture capital funds managed by state-owned 
or state engaged fund managers. In this case, the government uses a hands-on approach, i.e. 
sets up a venture capital fund owned by a public body, and the state's agent is responsible, as 
fund manager, for the selection of companies in the portfolio and to make investment 
decisions. In Central Eastern Europe, state participation in the venture capital market both 
as owner and fund manager is a widely used solution (Karsai, 2003, 2010, 2013).  
In its indirect public participation, the government increases the capital of venture capital 
funds, otherwise independent from the state and managed by private fund managers. In this 
case, the government delegates the implementation responsibilities to private fund 
managers, while the government itself, as one of the investors, acts with specific objectives in 
mind. These objectives can include, apart from yield expectations, the development of certain 
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regions, job creation, or the promotion of innovation. Currently, this indirect form of public 
venture capital market involvement dominates (Wilson and Silva, 2013; Wilson, 2015). This 
solution might be suitable, with the involvement of private investors, for establishing the 
market for seed financing or early stage investments through increasing funding sources, and 
at the same time it can contribute to gaining the professional expertise of the actors in the 
sector.  
Indirect public participation can be implemented using several techniques. In addition to 
individual funding to private venture capital funds, the government can invest in the form of 
a so-called fund of funds into private venture capital funds. In this latter case a state holding 
fund is established using public funds, and funds with private investors can tender for capital 
from this fund. In allocating public funds, the (state) manager of this holding fund finances 
only funds that commit in their investment policy to meeting targets that are relevant for the 
government, such as financing young firms with significant growth potential (Murray, 2007).  
Government participation in private venture capital funds can take place subject to the 
same terms and conditions as with private investors, i.e. pari passu. In such cases the state 
receives its share from the investment yield and bears the consequences of loss-making 
investments, in the same way as other investors in the fund. At the same time, in order to 
attract private investors, they can be offered more favourable conditions than those of the 
state actor. For example, private investors can be offered a higher proportion of the yield than 
their share or be required to bear a smaller proportion of the losses. Via these asymmetric 
terms, the benefits provided for private financing entities serve the promotion of investments 
important for the government, such as compensation for the higher risk and lower return on 
seed capital or early stage financing or investments in less development regions. In the 
2007/2013 planning period of the EU, the resources made available for CEE countries to 
promote venture capital financing enabled the launch of equity schemes based on indirect 
public participation, where the preferential terms afforded to private investors aimed to 
generate interest in financing innovative, young companies. 
  
 EU PROGRAMMES FINANCING PUBLIC VENTURE CAPITAL SCHEMES  
 
For the venture capital schemes in the region the EU funds in the 2007/2013 period were 
partly provided from the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP), and 
partly from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) framework programme. The 
former represented the main source of financial assets for investing venture capital at EU 
level, while one part of the funding available under the latter could be used by the Member 
State managing authorities as financial engineering instrument. In some of the Member 
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States, the so-called Joint European Resources for Micro and Medium Enterprises Scheme, 
the JEREMIE scheme, was implemented using the holding structure. The holding fund 
management was carried out by either national or regional institutions, in numerous cases 
engaging the European Investment Fund (EIF) in the management of those funds (EC, 2011). 
While the CIP operated at the level of EU countries, the JEREMIE initiative could be applied 
at regional level. The JEREMIE programme was basically a supplementary initiative in 
addition to the CIP programme of the EU. The financial engineering instrument offered by 
the JEREMIE programme enabled both old and new EU Member States to invest part of the 
Structural Funds into venture capital, as recoverable funds However, the venture capital 
made up only a very small proportion of the JEREMIE programme; the loans and guarantees 
that could be provided under the programme were much more significant (EIF, 2014). The 
venture capital was not even part of the financial engineering instruments in all participant 
countries and regions in the JEREMIE programme.  
In the region, the JEREMIE programme launched in 2005 was the first EU programme 
that actually provided the theoretical opportunity for CEE countries, which joined the EU as 
of 2004 in several stages, to use community funding, in this case a portion of the Structural 
Funds, to develop their venture capital sector. Before the launch of this programme, the EIF 
offered to conduct a study free of charge for the interested countries and regions on the 
current equity position of the given country that could be the basis for the assessment of 
venture needs (KPMG, 2011). Actually, the so-called gap analyses were completed very 
slowly. There were places where the content of the analyses was not accepted with 
satisfaction (such as in Poland), and in some occasions the content of the analysis was simply 
ignored when developing operational programmes (for example in Hungary) (European 
Court of Auditors, 2012).  
The EIF also made a proposal to manage holding funds, with reference to its experience 
in the fund of funds scheme for venture capital funds. In countries where the venture capital 
market was relatively undeveloped and authorities had no relevant experience, such as in 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia, the proposal from the EIF was accepted. 
However, countries with some previous experience with public equity schemes created public 
bodies suitable for the management of holding funds instead. According to the picture 
obtained from the background interviews, the relatively high management fee charged, the 
perceived difficulties in consultation due to the foreign headquarters, the lack of local 
knowledge and, presumably, the fact that it would have meant less freedom for the 
authorities to select venture capital fund managers, were all mentioned as arguments against 
the engagement of the EIF.  
It was not only the JEREMIE programme that provided the opportunity to establish a 
holding fund from EU resources in the framework of national operational programmes that 
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launched tenders for private investors in a fund of funds scheme to establish a joint venture 
capital fund for private investors. An example of this latter is the Polish National Capital 
Fund (NCF).  
The public funds were channelled into joint venture capital funds, financed from both the 
national operational programmes and by private investors, or to co-finance venture capital 
funds with no private investors. In addition to this, it was also possible in the JEREMIE 
arrangement to create several regional holding funds within a country. 2  
Due to the divergent data collection objectives by the numerous European and national 
institutions, it is rather difficult to form a comprehensive picture of the capital actually 
raised and invested by venture capital funds under public equity schemes and the magnitude 
of public participation in them. The aggregate statistical data for the EU (European Union, 
2014) show that, despite the various EU programmes, only a very small proportion was used 
by the authorities to finance venture capital. In the period between 2007 and 2013, according 
to the situation at the end of 2013, public resources used for venture capital funds in CEE 
countries made up only 6% of the value of the operational programmes, while the funds have 
so far used less than 60% of the allocations.  
The magnitude of the public equity schemes between 2007 and 2013 in the region can be 
estimated on the basis of data manually collected by the author from the websites of national 
managing authorities, ministries, holding fund managers, and academic papers on venture 
capital sector. (See Table below!) 
According to this, by the end of 2015, the 64 venture capital funds established in the 
region, financed by public participation, allow the investment of some EUR 1.1 billion. The 
"public" contribution had to include at least 15% of national funding, in addition to EU 
funding. Public sector contribution made up more than two-thirds of funds available for 
investment under the equity schemes between 2007 and 2013. The leverage effect of public 
funding is shown by the fact that it allowed a total of EUR 400 million in private capital to be 
raised in the venture capital market of the region. The greatest number of JEREMIE venture 
capital funds (28), with the highest amount in the region, more than EUR 440 million, had 
been established in Hungary. Capital commitments from private sectors investors make up 
30% of the Hungarian venture capital funds' resources, since the entire territory of Hungary 
is classified as an assisted region within the EU. The second highest number of hybrid funds 
have been created in Poland: here half of the resources of 16 venture capital funds, managing 
an estimated EUR 380 million capital, originate in the private sector. The third highest 
number of funds was established in Slovenia, at the same time the number of venture capital 
funds established in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia hardly reached five in 
                                                        
2 In Poland, a holding fund was established in several regions under the JEREMIE programme; 
however, only two of them launched tenders in 2014 for the managers of venture capital funds.  
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each country. In Estonia and Czech Republic, the authorities did not wish to exploit the 
opportunities offered by the JEREMIE initiative; in Croatia no public equity schemes have 
been started on account of the short time since its accession to the EU.  
Table 
Features of venture capital funds financed under public equity schemes in the 
countries of the CEE region, 2007 to 2013 (items, Million EUR) 
Country Number of 
funds 
 
Capital 
managed by 
the funds  
From the managed capital: 
Public funds 
 
Private funds  
 
Bulgaria 
 
2 21 21 0 
Croatia 
 
0 0 0 0 
Czech Republic 
 
0 0 0 0 
Estonia 
 
0 0 0 0 
Hungary 
 
28 443 310 133 
Latvia 
 
3 39 27 12 
Lithuania 
 
5 70 53 17 
Poland 
 
16 380 190 190 
Romania 
 
1 18 10 8 
Slovakia 
 
2 47 35 12 
Slovenia 
 
7 69 34 35 
Total CEE 
 
64 1087 680 407 
Comment: For Poland, funds were financed similarly to the JEREMIE programme but under a 
different arrangement. Polish data are based on estimates. 
Source: Own collection by the author, on the basis of websites of organisations managing public 
schemes and holding funds, and academic papers on venture capital sector.  
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BACKGROUND TO THE PRIVATE/PUBLIC CAPITAL COOPERATION 
 
Before the funding that could be applied for from the European Union from 2007 onwards, 
there were a few pilot projects to promote public/private venture capital market cooperation 
in the countries of the region. These projects also offered a practising ground and 
preparation opportunity for local authorities and market actors for subsequent tenders for 
much higher amounts.  
For example, in Poland an organisation investing public funds into private funds as fund 
of funds and operating as a holding fund was already established in 2005. The National 
Capital Fund (NCF) established in this manner intended to finance early stage technology 
companies, but by 2010 had only managed to engage with two venture capital fund managers 
(Klonowski, 2010, 2011). There was a later failed attempt also in Hungary: a venture capital 
fund 60% owned by the private Japanese SBI Holding Inc. and 40% by the state-owned 
Hungarian Development Bank (MFB) was established at the end of 2008 under the name SBI 
Europe Fund. It was managed by ELAN SBI Capital Partners (Binder, 2009). Since, 
according to the MFB, the operational efficiency of the joint fund was not sufficient, its yield 
expectations were too high and, from more than 300 assessed projects, it implemented only a 
single investment, the MFB acquired the share of the Japanese party in 2012 (MTI, 2012). In 
Estonia, the Estonian Development Fund (EDF), established in 2006, was granted a mandate 
to purchase minority shareholdings in start-ups with private investors, initially directly, then 
via a private venture capital fund, Smartcap. The experience of the EDF's operation was 
positive but the companies in the portfolio gained no major role in the Estonian economy 
(Kitsing, 2013). 
 The Latvian venture capital scheme between 2004 and 2006 was indeed already a 
prototype for the region's later equity schemes. Its application brought forward all the issues 
the other countries later had to face and also projected the potential benefits that hybrid 
investments are able to offer. The public owner of the project was the Latvian Guarantee 
Agency (LGA), and the private contribution came from regional pension funds, international 
venture capital funds and wealthy private individuals; the public share in ,practice was 
around 50% (Mannick, 2007). Instead of the former state controlled allocation mechanism, 
private sector experts were selected for the asset management. This eliminated the otherwise 
customary red tape and the lack of market orientation. However, due to its novelty, the 
drafting of the legal documentation took an extremely long time. The tender for the selection 
of the venture capital fund's manager attracted an unexpected number of applicants (eight 
applicants for three positions). The selection of the winners involved huge tension and took a 
long time. Some of the unsuccessful applicants sought redress from the public procurement 
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authorities. The main mistake was the failure to involve the representatives of the venture 
capital industry in the early development stage of the programme. The profit/loss 
distribution parameters of the private investor incentive scheme had to be corrected during 
the notification procedure but before its completion (Mannick, 2007; Avots et al., 2013). 
According to the researchers assessing the Latvian scheme, a much greater emphasis should 
have been paid to business training related to venture capital financing. An incubator 
programme would have been required for high growth companies, in order to broaden the 
range of companies potentially using venture capital financing. Regular communication and 
consultation opportunities would also have been needed between investment fund managers 
and the various stakeholders. However, as a positive effect from the scheme, cooperation 
between the public authority and the private investors became much more intense (Mannick, 
2007). 
 
NOTIFICATION OF VENTURE CAPITAL SCHEMES  
 
Individual countries had to seek approval from the European Commission for their EU-
financed public equity schemes to apply in the 2007/2013 period, i.e. they had to notify 
them. This was far from being a routine procedure, since the issue of potential market 
distortion is particularly valid in connection with the state’s participation as an investor in 
the venture capital market, i.e. whether the venture capital provided to individual businesses 
qualifies as state aid conferring competitive advantage on those companies. Due to the 
complexity of this issue, the European Commission issued specific guidelines in 2006 under 
the title Risk Capital Guidelines, (RCG), and amended them several times due to the change 
in market circumstances. The requirements to be met by equity schemes have been laid down 
by the EU in 2009 in a separate set of rules, in the General Block Exemption Regulation 
(GBER). Both the RCG and the GBER contained expectations for venture capital funds, their 
managers and companies in receipt of equity investment (EC, 2011; Nicolaides, 2013).3  
It was expected that the funds to be established have, apart from the government, for-
profit private sector owners, and 50% (in assisted areas 30%) of investments individually 
come from private investors. Private investors must have an identical share of the benefits 
arising from and obligations attached to the investment as public sector investors (incentives 
to private investors were also allowed in assisted areas). The fund management had to be 
commercial and the remuneration of fund managers tied to the performance of the fund; 
                                                        
3 Amongst others, the Guidelines set out the criteria under which the investors' activity can be 
considered as for-profit, being a material precondition for the exclusion of prohibited competitive 
advantage; furthermore, they set the size, age, regional location and sector of the companies that 
can receive a certain size and type of equity investment without it qualifying as state aid.  
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fund managers had to be selected in competitive tenders. The funds had to make their 
investment decision at arm's length, in the possession of a business and exit plan, with an 
appropriate representation of private investors. The investment volume per company was 
capped. (It could be EUR 1.5 million in any 12 month period; however, this ceiling was raised 
to EUR 2.5 million from 2011.) The investment eligibility was different, based on the size, 
life-cycle and location of the companies concerned. 
The importance of this notification procedure was highlighted by the fact that public 
authorities and investors wishing to participate in their equity schemes and companies in 
search of venture capital faced for the first time the EU’s expectations that were sometimes 
rather restrictive, at least compared to their domestic practice.  
The Hungarian programme for notifying a JEREMIE venture capital programme is a 
good example of its features and what the competent European authorities actually 
examined in the approval procedure. In the draft, all cumulative conditions set out in the EU 
Guidelines on venture capital have been met: 30% participation by private investors; 
investment at arm's length; business plan mandatory for each transaction and a realistic exit 
strategy. What is more, according to the draft, fund managers already had to make a 
preliminary presentation of the selection and assessment criteria they wished to apply to an 
application. The programme notification took place in several steps since, as time went by, 
the managing authority increased the envelope it intended to invest as venture capital. The 
requirement of commercial management was included through the requirement that fund 
managers had to operate by seeking to optimise the yield for the investors, and their 
remuneration consisted of a fixed fee, depending on the fund size, and a performance based 
success fee. The government as investor was not involved in making investment decisions. 
Later, the draft was even more clear that fund managers had to be independent from any 
kind of public influence. The scheme provided for the representation of private investors in 
the decision making, for example via their participation in the Investors's Committee or the 
Advisory Committee. However, the state owner of the funds (the holding fund) had a veto or 
preferential vote on strategic decisions related to the fund's operation, and so, amongst 
others, on matters related to the reduction of the subscribed capital, buy-back or transfer of 
ownership of the equity fund units, amendments to the operating policy of the fund and the 
payment of the yields. When fund managers entered into agreement with the holding fund, 
they undertook to meet these targets and, if they failed to do so, they had to pay a penalty to 
the holding fund (European Commission, 2008, 2012, 2013). 
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MAIN ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC EQUITY SCHEMES  
 
Crucial for the success of equity schemes in developed countries were the time frame 
available for the preparation and implementation of the scheme, the commercial approach in 
setting the rules for the investments by venture capital funds participating in the scheme, the 
possibility for the scheme's territorial extension, the appropriate equity volume available for 
investment, the experience of the actors within the sector, the unbiased selection of private 
fund managers and incentivisation commensurate with the risks involved, and publicity for 
the schemes (Karsai, 2014).  
 Time horizon of public equity schemes 
The launch of the equity schemes was rather lengthy, even according to the EU's own 
evaluation. The European Commission issued the first comprehensive and relevant 
explanatory memorandum in February 2011, which helped Member States, by distinguishing 
the various types of financial engineering instruments, to interpret the regulation of 
Structural Funds in conjunction with that of financial engineering instruments (European 
Court of Auditors, 2012). Its absence seriously slowed down the launch of the schemes and 
aligning the EU funds with the legal requirements of individual facilities. This implies the risk 
that the volume of investments would fail to reach the envisaged level, since the funds would 
not have enough time during the term of the schemes to invest all equity available to them 
(Tillvaxtverket, 2011).  
Following the approval of the notification for the capital schemes, the holding funds must 
first be established. They usually launch tenders in several consecutive years for venture 
capital fund managers, and in every round the venture capital funds were established only 
after the completion of the tendering which contracted their managers. After having 
negotiated the terms of investment, agreed and concluded an agreement, they then made the 
equity available to the companies concerned in tranches, mainly on security grounds. All 
these took a lot longer than the time later available for spending the funds, although this is 
the most important period in the funds' lives. In Latvia, for example, more than half of the 
JEREMIE programme's time frame was spent on the legal and institutional establishment of 
the facility, the selection of the intermediary fund managers and setting up the funds, and 
then publishing the calls (Michie and Wishlade, 2012). In Hungary, where the JEREMIE 
venture capital programme was first launched in the region, at the end of 2013, the original 
closing date of the programme, of the altogether 28 funds published in total, ten funds had 
not been established, mainly due to the repeated licensing to increase the funds' volumes.  
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The slowness of notification and, tendering and setting up the funds late put the holding 
funds and the managers of the venture capital funds under pressure to invest their funds 
before the final absorption deadline of the Structural Funds, i.e. by the end of 2015, since any 
unspent funds must be repaid to the European Union. This urgency inevitably can negatively 
influence the quality of investments: for example, less promising companies may receive the 
venture capital supplemented by public funds, or less innovative businesses that could 
possibly raise the required funding from other sources (cf.: Tillvaxtverket, 2011).  
 Size of venture capital funds 
The equity schemes recommended by the EU to the authorities in the region ignored the 
finding of the research that the widely held belief that very early stage seed capital 
investments are to be implemented by small size specialised funds is wrong (Meyer, 2007; 
Dimov and Murray, 2006). Indeed, in particular in the US, the largest and most experienced 
venture capital funds implemented the most seed capital investments. The US model for seed 
capital financing implicitly indicates that seed capital is not viable in the market if used in an 
isolated way. It should instead be perceived as the first phase of the process during which a 
successful company gets through several investment rounds till the exit of the investor. As 
such, US investors engaged in seed capital financing are multi-phase investors and, in their 
case, managing USD one billion in funds is not rare. In these large size funds, the full range of 
the activities decreases the high risk of the earliest phase (Murray and Lingelbach, 2009). 
Since, in the venture capital sector, new fund managers’ learning and gaining experience is a 
time-consuming process, due to the funds not performing adequately on these grounds they 
are not able to enter the market with newer and newer funds. As such, a government policy 
providing capital to numerous small new funds is necessarily able to have an influence only 
in the short run. Additionally, the demonstration effect is also negative, i.e. private investors 
will perceive investment in such funds as excessively risky (Meyer, 2007).  
Individual venture capital funds in the countries of the region, financed through holding 
funds from the EU Structural Funds, managed on average EUR 16 million in equity, as shown 
in the table compiled by the author. The average base size however covers two different 
arrangements with different sizes. The size of the so-called co-finance funds is smaller than 
the average, close to EUR 12 million. These funds work exclusively from government funds 
and private equity was contributed only to individual investments, in the minimum required 
proportion. The size of the so-called joint funds, also known as hybrid funds, was on average 
close to EUR 18 million. In terms of their number and the equity managed, the joint funds 
accounted for nearly 90% of the funds. The co-finance funds mainly financed the seed capital 
phase, and their size was smaller to begin with, due to the lack of private equity. Co-financing 
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capital seed investment funds proved to be less attractive to private investors. This is 
suggested by the fact that in several countries there were no private applicants to manage 
seed capital funds. The Hungarian market was an exception; there it was mainly investors 
tendering for joint growth funds who were interested in joint seed capital funds.  
The average EUR 18 million size of the hybrid venture capital funds established in the 
CEE region with public participation (as shown in the table) shows that funds here are even 
smaller than the funds established in the more developed countries that already proved to be 
too small4, and so they very probably fail to initiate an economical and self-sustaining 
operation. A continuing public financing need for venture capital funds financed from public 
funds can therefore be forecasted for the next programming period.  
 Investment restrictions in public equity schemes 
Restrictions related to the investment targets for public funds are against the very nature of 
venture capital, and so rules of this type decrease the success that can be reached (EVCA, 
2010). That is, it is impossible to tell in advance in which areas and which sectors an 
appropriate number of quickly growing companies appear and where significant inventions 
appear that can be supported by venture capital (cf. EC, 2012). According to the experience in 
developed countries, the government schemes often sought to promote financing in 
industries or geographical regions that attracted no capital, leading to a waste of resources.  
Another conceptual problem is that the affected venture capital funds can finance 
companies at a certain development stage or companies of a certain size or age. The schemes 
can also specify which types of securities the investors can use, and the public arrangements 
can also influence the future of the companies if acquisitions or secondary equity sales are 
restricted. These constraints can probably be understandable from the viewpoint of 
government policy but they go against the process of business. The fact that the objectives of 
the public and private sectors do not necessarily coincide means an obvious contradiction. A 
potential pressure exists between the government's social and economic development 
objectives and the for-profit approach of the private sector. For example, the development of 
small and medium enterprises and the promotion of innovation is a flagship public objective, 
while this in only a by-product for private investors who are interested in profit (cf. Mason, 
2013)  
A typical mistake in the developed countries’ government schemes was to prescribe that 
funding could be awarded only to domestic businesses (Lerner, 2009). It seems to contradict 
the geographical restrictions on investments that, amongst the venture capital funds 
                                                        
4 The size of individual venture capital funds financed by UK regional holding funds was typically 
between GBP 15 to 25 million (Regeneris Consulting Ltd., 2013). 
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financing the early stage, primarily those that are perceived by international institutional 
investors as worth financing can be successful, and on the other hand, the equity coming 
from public sources can flood the market, which can have detrimental effects on market 
processes (Lerner, 2009).  
Although in the meanwhile the mistakes of earlier public schemes became publicly 
known, including the negative effects or inefficiency of the restrictions, it seems that these 
standards, originating in the West and partly proved to be wrong in the meanwhile, have 
been applied in the government equity schemes implemented in the CEE region.  
The use of the Structural Funds precluded investments in foreign companies. Individual 
governments could have, at the most, some room for manoeuvre in appointing regions 
eligible for financing within the countries, although this was largely influenced by the assisted 
or non-assisted status, based on the development of these regions. As regards the purpose of 
these investments, rules in most countries allowed only investment by capital increase but 
did not allow acquisitions from existing shareholders. In the field of banned investment 
purpose use, funds could nowhere use the equity to substitute for loans extended to the 
companies; moreover, they could not underwrite reorganisations for companies in 
difficulties. Innovation financing was a priority objective in most countries. In the schemes 
within the region, the rules on state aid uniformly specified how old the companies in receipt 
of funding could be and what their sales revenue could be and also excluded certain sectors 
from financing. Restrictions even covered the amount of equity that could be invested in a 
company with a single investment decision and how many such decisions could be made per 
annum.  
The restrictive rules have been changed and clarified, even when the schemes were 
already in progress. For example, in the second round of the Hungarian JEREMIE 
programme - as a consequence of the related notification procedure - fund managers already 
selected in the first round could not apply for growth funds, but the same shareholders could 
apply again by launching a new fund manager, which questioned the purpose of this 
restriction (Zsembery, 2012).  
The problematic nature of the restrictions is well illustrated by an extreme case of a fund 
in the Latvian JEREMIE scheme. Here the three winners were unable to invest even one-
third of the available funding one year before the period available for investment. In 
particular, one of the funds, financing start-ups, lagged behind its commitments. The fund 
should have provided follow-up financing for companies already financed by the seed capital 
fund, set up exclusively from public funds. Additionally, this fund expressly targeted 
technology companies. All these conditions have tended to restrict the fund's options. It 
sought to solve this issue by trying to find companies abroad that were ready to register 
themselves in Latvia and transfer a part of their activities. However, it can be assumed that 
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these companies will not remain in the country later on, since their further financing cannot 
be ensured (Avots et al., 2013). 
 The majority of the restrictions of the equity schemes in the region were unnecessary, 
either because the funds themselves would have complied with them in any case or because 
they circumvented them. A further part of the rules discouraged potential, such as foreign 
investors or fund managers from cooperating with the state, that could possibly have brought 
greater benefits than those arising from the restriction.  
Incentives to private investors 
Incentives can take the form of distributing the profits after the exit from the transaction 
between public and private investors or the timing of the public and private contributions 
and the compensation for possible losses suffered by private investors (Murray, 2007). Tax 
relief can also be linked with public equity schemes and could further increase the willingness 
of private investors to join funds within the scheme. 
The experience in the region with the arrangements designed to invest public venture 
capital show a mixed picture. In the Member States of the region where the venture capital 
sector was relatively developed, a serious interest was taken in investments in joint funds. 
However, there were funds in several countries that could not be set up after their launch, 
due to the reluctance of private investors, such as with regard to the Romanian Ascenta 
Operation and the Latvian Imprimatur funds.  
Where authorities used the incentives for private investors, the interest from private fund 
managers and the private investors behind them was intense, apart from the very small size 
seed capital funds. The incentive arrangement in the equity scheme offered by the Polish 
NVC required lower risk taking from and offered higher yields to private investors (Rudnicka 
and Dietl, 2013). The generated revenue went to the private investors as long as it reached 
the equity invested. Then, the public holding fund received the equity up to the amount of its 
investment. In addition to this, the revenue again went to private investors until the pre-set 
minimum yield was reached, then to the public fund, again until a minimum yield was 
reached (KFK, 2011). In the Latvian equity scheme, the share of private investors from the 
success was applicable above the expected 6% internal rate of return, and in the event of a 
loss, private investors were the first to receive their equity back (Avots et al., 2013).  
In Hungary, the preference of private investors took place in two forms. On the one 
hand, it was in the form of the upside reward applicable to public investors, which 
channelled the entire yield exceeding the current reference rate to private sector investors, 
i.e. public investors were not entitled to the profit in excess of the reference rate. The other 
 19 
 
preference was loss mitigation. Under this rule, the first 5% of the loss generated was to be 
borne by public investors only, and further losses by the investors pro rata to their paid up 
contribution. Later, for the joint growth funds, the loss rate to be borne only by the state was 
raised from 5% to 10%, and for seed capital funds from 5% to 15%. The investors continued to 
bear losses in excess of these rates pro rata to their equity. The justification for this increase 
in the state's loss bearing is questioned by the fact that the number of applicants in each 
tender rounds was far above the possibility provided by the actual tender (cf. European Court 
of Auditors, 2012). According to the experience gained, these incentives in the countries of 
the region with more developed venture capital sector excessively increased the interest on 
the investors' side, thus decreasing the efficiency of public expenditure. 
Selection of private fund managers  
Public participation in venture capital schemes always carries the potential for abuse (Florida 
and Smith, 1993; Leleux et al., 1998). As a consequence of personal and political ties, and 
intentional abuse, the preferences many times do not reach the intended beneficiary 
companies, and so public funds are spent without any benefit to society as a whole. This is 
particularly the case for such arrangements, where no clearly set criteria apply and public 
investors are checked only rarely or even never.  
Interestingly, in the evaluation of the Western experience with equity schemes, issues 
related to the selection of fund managers are rarely included as it would not be particularly 
problematic there.5 Murray et al. (2012) mentioned, as an important counter-argument 
against public equity schemes that, although the knowledge required for the selection of fund 
managers was not necessarily available within the authorities dealing with the tenders, in 
many cases they selected applicant teams with no relevant track record but which had 
managed government funds earlier (Murray et al., 2012). Since experienced professionals 
usually left hybrid funds and switched to the larger size private venture capital funds, this 
further decreased the probability of success for the investments made by hybrid funds.  
Indeed, regulatory capture (i.e. when participants from the private and public sector 
primarily aim to acquire direct and indirect subsidies to be distributed by the state) is not 
unknown in the West, either. This is the case when the beneficiaries of the scheme will be the 
                                                        
5 The exception to this was the internationally recognised SBIC scheme from the US, serving as a 
reference model for public equity schemes in many Western states. The positive assessment of this 
scheme was not influenced by the fact that, according to Lerner (2002), political connections 
dominated the selection procedure over investment criteria. Therefore federal criminal investigations 
took place for some SBICs on the grounds of mismanagement, incompetence and fraud. According to 
an estimate cited by Kenney et al. (2004) nine out of ten SBICs violated official standards and dozens 
of companies committed crimes (Lerner, 2002; Kenney et al., 2004). 
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acquaintances of the scheme managers of legislators (Lerner, 2014). In order to avoid 
political pressure in the selection of funds and portfolio companies involved in the scheme, a 
transparent decision-making process, similar to that customary in the private sector, is 
required (EC, 2012).  
According to EU rules, fund managers intending to participate in equity schemes in the 
region had to compete for funds in public tenders. Theoretically, applications from foreign 
fund managers to the managed joint funds with the state were not excluded; however, in 
practice it was rather complicated in the absence of local knowledge. In the scheme launched 
by the Polish NCF, a foreign fund manager could win only on one occasion. The situation 
improved over time, since in a Polish BRIdge VC scheme published by the NCRD in 2014 
foreign fund managers had already won both published positions (NCBIR, 2014). EIF also 
found a renowned regional fund manager as a winner in the Romanian JEREMIE 
programme.  
When conducting the tenders, public holding funds usually scored the private fund 
managers tendering for public funds on the basis of a pre-set set of criteria. For the Polish 
NCF, the model for this was the method applied by the EBRD earlier, although the actual 
implementation, as shown by the interviews, did not necessarily follow the model. The 
promised quality of the portfolio to be set up was also included in the set of criteria, which 
obviously could have been the consequence of the funds' operation.  
In several cases, the public procurement rules applicable in individual countries proved 
to be unsuitable for the tendering system for venture capital funds. The reason for the 
extension of tender evaluation announced by the Polish NCF to several years was that the 
state could commit itself only after the commitments by private participants, and it was 
difficult to maintain the interest of private actors for such an extended period of time 
(Rudnicka and Dietl, 2013). According to the Latvian public procurement rules, the winner 
had to be selected on the basis of the lowest price offered and this diverted the outcome of 
tenders from basic criteria, such as the business plan submitted by fund managers and the 
experience and expertise of fund managers i.e. the ability to pass professional knowledge to 
the future companies, in addition to the equity. By contrast, the management fee offered and 
the expected highest equity contribution received a greater emphasis in the evaluation (Avots 
et al., 2013). After the first round of JEREMIE, in 2012, the Latvian authorities launched 
another round, where, after the change of the holding fund's manager, the criteria were 
slightly restricted and a great number of experts were involved in the evaluation. At the same 
time, the evaluation continued to include many unclear criteria and so five tenderers 
challenged the award decision. As a follow-up, the court decided that the authority should not 
enter into the contracts and rewrite the draft contracts. However, this delayed the expected 
launch date of the funds by a year, leading to a very short investment period (Avots et al., 
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2013). In the first round of the Hungarian JEREMIE programme, during the period between 
the publication of the scheme and the awards, the authority amended the terms of the call for 
tender, postponed the announcement of the award, then declared the tender unsuccessful 
and published a new one.  
The background interviews with fund managers participating in the Hungarian JEREMIE 
tender and press news suggest a presumption that government ties could have meant an 
advantage, similarly to the public procurement in infrastructure, in winning funding. In the 
light of the owners as published in the press, amongst the 28 winning funds, government ties 
could have been assumed in 11 cases. Obviously one cannot exclude that the tender submitted 
by the fund managers concerned was not excellent from a professional point of view and their 
winning was a result of this (cf. Bruckner, 2012). The exclusion of government ties and 
proximity as a factor influencing the selection of winner was not always successful, even in 
Latvia (Avots et al., 2013).  
The possibly biased or non-transparent selection of tenders in the region will not mean 
that successful fund managers with an experience gained in the region cannot be amongst the 
winners. Their number, however, was limited to begin with and so, in markets where many 
positions were published, newly established fund managers with no track record in venture 
capital could also win. Their senior managers took part in the competition, relying on their 
banking and corporate top management background rather than their track record in venture 
capital. 
The expert interviews raised a unique regional problem i.e. that the legislation presumed 
the existence of fund managers who were independent from the investors; in practice, in 
many cases these two sets overlapped. The selection of the fund managers therefore meant 
granting a good position to the private investors behind the fund. This questions the practical 
importance of selecting fund managers with appropriate expertise and experience. Indeed, 
the decision is not made on the fund managers themselves but on the type and person of 
private investors joining the government. For example, the majority of fund managers in 
Hungary were not independent fund managers but so-called captive fund managers, i.e. 
belonging to the sphere of interest of a single investor. However, the tender rules contained 
no provision of any kind to restrict the individual proportion of private investors alongside 
the public investor.  
In the management of public equity schemes in the region, a further problem was caused 
by changes occurring in the ownership and management of fund managers after winning 
the tender. Some of these were caused by the fact that the owner of the fund that won the 
position failed to make the committed contribution on the grounds of loss of interest and due 
to this the public funds already awarded to that fund had to be published again. It occurred 
that wealthy private individuals ran into trouble due to problems with their other businesses 
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and thus they were forced to get rid of their investments in their venture capital funds and to 
transfer their funds to other private investors. The termination of the solvency of venture 
capital fund owners affected by the broker scandals which erupted in 2015 in the Hungarian 
market made the operation of some joint funds also impossible.  
In the public equity schemes within the region, the tendering scheme was the actual scene 
for "fights" between the public and private sphere, and so all inadequately handled legal and 
interest issues, as well as the lack of transparency, culminated here. The authorities had not 
realised how important transparency is for trust and fruitful cooperation, and how harmful 
the design of scoring systems and the strictness in requiring compliance from applicants with 
formal elements of the tenders can be to later cooperation, which is based on counter-
dependencies. The possible corruption and the bias on the authorities’ side became visible 
here for the profession and the public.  
Private investors in public equity schemes 
In a commercially operating regional or local venture capital market, the range of private 
owners investing in the funds already gives some indication on the range of investor groups 
that can be potential private investors in joining the public funds in public equity schemes 
within the countries of the region. According to the data published by the EVCA on the value 
of equity raised for venture and private equity investment in the region and the distribution 
of institutions providing the funds by type, between 2009 and 2013 it was the public bodies 
that provided equity in the highest proportion (39%). The second investor group with the 
largest weight (19%) was represented by the fund of funds, i.e. institutions that raised equity 
from other institutions for the purposes of investing it in venture capital funds. Lagging far 
behind are commercial banks (8%) and pension funds (8%), and insurance companies, 
corporations and wealthy private individuals with a 5% share each. The proportion of asset 
managers in the sources of the private venture capital funds of the region was 3% on average. 
The identity of the remaining 8% of those financing the value of the investments was not 
known by the data collectors (Höppner, 2014). 
Since the size of the joint venture capital funds, capitalised with government funds was 
typically smaller, for them the natural investor partners are flexible institutions with good 
market information, managing smaller asset volumes (cf. Tillvaxtverket, 2011). Amongst 
them belong mainly institutions, foundations managing family assets and private venture 
capital funds. Amongst the non-institutional investors, business angels and wealthy private 
individuals provide the main source for the funds. According to the experience of the Western 
schemes, due to this latter group of investors, local knowledge and the relationship with local 
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investors, inevitable for appropriate investment choices, are particularly important for the 
successful operation of hybrid funds (Tillvaxtverket, 2011).  
However, the choices of hybrid venture capital funds between investors were largely 
constrained by the fact that there is a relatively low number of such investors in the region 
(cf. Szerb et al., 2007; Karsai, 2010; Klonowski, 2011). Due to the low number of family asset 
managers, foundations with assets to be invested and business angels ready to invest on a 
regular basis, the participants in the hybrid venture capital funds of the Central Eastern 
European region are typically wealthy private individuals.  
The ownership data of venture capital funds established with joint public/private capital 
are not public in the region. On the basis of business and academic publications, the picture 
of private investors involved in public equity schemes is rather mixed. Where venture capital 
investments are allowed as diversification assets for pension funds and insurance 
undertakings, these institutions meant an actual choice for the role of a private investor in 
public equity schemes. This was the reason for example that, in the Baltic States institutional 
investors, and more precisely primarily pension funds, paid particular attention to hybrid 
schemes. At the same time it was problematic, even in the Baltic States, that the market 
proved to be too small for institutional investors. Big banks, when they wished to invest their 
assets in venture capital, did so in large fund of funds rather than in small size joint funds co-
financed by the government (Avots et al., 2013).  
In the countries of the region where regulations did not allow the above institutions to 
invest their assets in venture capital funds, such as in the Bulgarian or Slovakian markets, it 
was much more difficult to find a well capitalised private investor for joint funds. At the same 
time, the capital volumes managed by private pension funds decreased, having a detrimental 
effect not only on the potential range of participants in public equity schemes but also by 
worsening the supply of funds in the venture capital market as a whole. This process started 
in Hungary, back in 2010, when most savings accumulated in private pension funds were 
channelled into the state pension scheme; but this trend also appeared in Bulgaria, Slovakia, 
Romania and Poland.  
Out of the private investors in Latvian joint funds, corporate investors participated in a 
single fund, pension funds in four funds, banks in two funds, and private individuals in three 
funds (Prohorovs, 2014). The only Romanian joint fund was co-financed by the asset 
manager of a large bank. According to Polish expert interviews, the public equity scheme was 
exclusively joined by wealthy private individuals with their investments, and financing was 
undertaken by a foreign venture capital fund in a single case.  
In Hungary, only one commercial bank was involved as investor in a joint fund. At the 
same time, amongst the owners of the funds, financial investor and broker groups were 
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more frequent; these organisations can be found amongst the owners of eight JEREMIE 
funds. They supplemented their investment portfolio existing in other areas with venture 
capital. The other owners of Hungarian joint funds, that became known, were mainly wealthy 
individuals with an extensive track record in corporate ownership or top management. 
Amongst the investors, 13 out of the 100 wealthiest Hungarians participated in 18 funds out 
of the 28. It can be assumed that, for them, the possibility to acquire the funds allocated by 
the EU to the scheme was a very good business opportunity, as signalled by the over-
subscription to the tender. Wealthy individuals, who earlier had not been interested in the 
venture capital market at all, also indicated their intention to participate. According to the 
one-off survey prepared by the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) in 2015, after the state, 
representing the highest share of the equity raised by the Hungarian JEREMIE venture 
capital funds (71%), the contribution from wealthy private individuals (14%) was the second 
most significant source of equity. Out of the total equity of the funds only 6% was provided by 
corporate investors, 5% by various asset managers and only 2% by banks. The remaining 4% 
came from types of investors, and the equity contributions from the fund managers 
themselves (NBH, 2015).  
 
THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC EQUITY SCHEMES ON THE VENTURE CAPITAL 
MARKET IN THE REGION 
 
The negative consequences of the crowding out effect on private actors' equity (cf. Leleux 
and Surlemont, 2003; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2006) did not have to be taken into 
account anywhere, since private investors were not or only occasionally interested in the 
financing of very early stage innovative companies. The venture capital supply of this market 
segment was previously met nearly exclusively by state-owned venture capital funds. In this 
way, the hybrid funds set up under this scheme meant competition to the incumbent fully 
state-owned funds and to each other. This latter effect appeared only in those few countries, 
such as in the Hungarian and Polish market, where a significant number of hybrid funds have 
been established due to the public equity schemes.  
The supply of projects of a suitable quality was problematic everywhere in the region. 
Venture capital funds set up with public funds had to face, soon after their establishment, 
that there were not enough promising projects. In addition, a vast amount of investment 
offers were received by the hybrid venture capital funds in the region, a great proportion of 
which were not investment-ready, that is "ripe for investment". Projects ended up with 
venture capital funds in great numbers that they could not show an interest for. Namely, 
funds intended to invest in companies in a developed stage with a marketable and proven 
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product where the target was only an even higher market penetration. However, there were 
only a few of this type of company in the region. Hence, it was not only the equity available 
for investment and the experienced venture capital professionals that were missing from the 
preconditions for the successful operation of government equity schemes, but also the 
activity of business angels, university business centres, incubators and business accelerator 
organisations, raising the projects up to the level when they are able to receive venture 
capital.6  
The Western experience also highlighted that the state must allocate funds, in addition to 
the envisaged public venture capital schemes, education, preparation and promotional 
campaigns to ensure that the applicants present projects that are actually mature enough for 
investment. Looking at the cost/benefit side, training and supporting entrepreneurs with 
information proved to be much more efficient than the support provided to purchase 
machinery or equipment or facilitate manufacturing at an early stage (Keutschnigg and 
Nielsen, 2001, Mason and Kwok, 2012; Avots et al., 2013).  
As regards success, it is an important question whether the further equity needs of 
promising projects can be ensured after the conclusion of the government schemes. It is an 
even more burning issue in the region, since it is still not very attractive to private venture 
capital investors in international comparison. Where the application of the model of public 
participation used in earlier programming periods goes on, then 2016-17, a nearly two year 
period, must be expected as one that must be survived without public equity, in view of the 
administrative processing time of compliance with EU rules. It might occur that a plan for 
setting up regional funds of a greater size with public funds takes shape, which is able to 
operate as fund of funds in the market of several countries, i.e. that finances private venture 
capital funds outside the national framework. The advantage of this solution would be that 
institutional investors who are unable to finance a smaller venture capital fund, due to its 
size, could join regional funds.  
To a very different extent in each country, public equity schemes however increased the 
supply of venture capital to young, innovative SMEs. The public equity contribution 
generated interest from private investors towards a segment that was not attractive to it 
earlier. At the same time, the equity gap remained for very early stage projects in the seed 
capital stage and the preceding, so-called pre-seed phase. A significant learning process also 
took place in every market, including among the authorities and private market actors and 
the business providing the demand. At the same time, the schemes struggled with numerous 
                                                        
6 In Hungary, the appearance of the hybrid JEREMIE funds "drove" the development of business 
development services and activated local business angels and the few private sector seed capital funds. 
In addition, the state launched a separate tender for the establishment of incubators; however, its start 
date was postponed due to the lack of funds actually transferred.  
 26 
 
issues already flagged by their Western predecessors and so they could have been prevented 
or mitigated.  
The direct effect of the schemes on the economy can be measured via the increase in the 
number of financed businesses, the acceleration of their development, the creation of new 
jobs and the growing innovation performance. The analysis of the effects on companies can 
provide answers on the effectiveness of the work done by venture capital funds co-financed 
by the state; whether their companies became successful in business and at what return they 
were able to exit the investment. Since the actual investments by public equity schemes in the 
region started only post 2010, these questions can be answered only in a few years time. The 
future evaluations would be important, since Western surveys usually have not verified a 
stronger effect on innovation by public investment as opposed to private financing (Murray, 
1998; Beroni and Tykvova, 2012, 2015), failed to demonstrate a significant revenue 
increasing role of public participation (Grilli and Murtinu, 2014) or its greater efficiency 
measured on the basis of expenditure (Alperovych et al., 2013). Additionally, the 
performance measured upon the exit of companies in receipt of public funds showed a mixed 
picture (Cumming and Johan, 2008, 2009, 2013; Buzzacchi et al, 2013; Croce and Ughetto, 
2014).  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article examined the government's role as an investor in venture capital markets, 
through a detailed overview of the magnitude, forms and features of public participation, 
using examples from the CEE countries. It presented that, as opposed to the direct 
participation implying the risk of market distortion, CEE states contribute to raising funds in 
the venture capital market in a more indirect way, by involving the private sector. 
Theoretically, it is more successful in providing access to financing to early stage, risky but 
promising projects than the earlier fully public venture capital investments, that the selection 
is exempt from political influence, and that managers entrusted with the management of the 
investments have appropriate expertise and receive remuneration commensurate with their 
performance.  
All in all, the experience suggests that the equity schemes launched by CEE states had all 
the positive and negative features that characterised similar schemes in developed countries. 
Countries in the region did not necessarily avoid the earlier mistakes; in some cases this was 
not made possible by the EU rules. In addition, the problems caused by the red tape involved 
in the operation of the EU and the national states were supplemented by the paternalistic and 
corrupt traditions of the region and the fact that cultural-institutional conditions cannot be 
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changed from one day to the next. The avoidable typical mistakes included the extensive 
delays in decision-making, requiring more than half of the available time, and that 
government efforts exclusively aimed to increase the offer of venture capital and no demand 
side steps were taken, such as facilitating the establishment of incubation and accelerator 
organisations. The small size of the funds, unable to ensure efficient and self-sustaining 
operation, is also one of the known negative features. State restrictions on the size, 
geographical scope of investments and on the age of the financed companies raised a known 
problem, since these clearly worsened the efficiency and effectiveness of investments, and 
their circumvention in itself wasted resources.  
The implementation of equity schemes however provided important knowledge to public 
bodies, strangers in the worlds of venture capital, in becoming aware of private investor 
attitudes, the assessment of the available potential resources and the operation of the 
incentive arrangements, and mapping the components to the lack of interest. This learning 
process was also useful for private investors since, in connection with the equity schemes, 
they could become aware of the criteria the government considers important and the 
standards of the European Union.  
Compared to the Western experience, in Central Eastern Europe, the issues of finding 
and incentivising private investors in public equity schemes was even more pronounced. In 
the underdeveloped venture capital market of the region, the business angels, university 
foundations and smaller family asset managers potentially suitable for the role of co-investor, 
who could be interested in a joint investment with the state due to their size and expertise, 
were present to a lesser extent. The extensive preferences provided to private investors due to 
the lack of private investors in the markets of the region however resulted in wealthy private 
individuals, with publicly known strong connections to the public administration, taking up 
the role of the co-investor, and the lack of transparency allowed for the use of such 
connections when selecting fund managers. The biased selection of fund managers and the 
lack of experienced fund managers led to the dilution of the fund managers' market, since, in 
many cases, the primary objective of these less knowledgeable fund managers was exclusively 
to acquire public funds.  
Although the schemes are not yet completed and their results are not completely 
measurable, the above issues suggest a waste of a significant part of community resources. 
The success of the scheme was already questioned by the fact that demand-side measures to 
facilitate the soundness of investment offers started late. The effect of the equity schemes will 
be reduced by the fact that, in some countries of the region, the venture capital market is 
unable to absorb the excess equity supply during the time available to use the Structural 
Funds, while a lack of equity will occur after the closure of the schemes. A further equity 
supply to the strengthened companies, financed jointly by public and private resources, 
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seems to be not ensured. There are no funds of funds covering several countries in the region 
that could contribute to the financing of the venture capital funds established by public 
participation in another round.  
Despite the above deficiencies and systemic issues, there were several positive effects in 
the venture capital market of the region. Thus, the significant increase in the equity supply in 
itself led to the creation of a few, outstandingly successful innovations. The awareness of 
venture capital as a corporate financing instrument has grown, and the operation of 
companies included in venture capital fund portfolios became much more transparent, 
resulting in the whitening of the economy in a very narrow scope. In connection with the 
opportunities offered by the scheme, the activity of business angels became more intense; a 
new range of private investors appeared in the segment of venture capital where earlier 
there was hardly any interest. Fund families have been created that are able to provide 
appropriate financing to projects with a perspective, by following their entire life cycle. 
Finally, as a consequence of the schemes, numerous new institutions appeared in the region 
that are able to assist in preparing professional investment proposals. As a result, the new 
financial engineering instruments based on public/private cooperation contributed to the 
modernisation of public venture capital schemes in the Eastern part of Europe.  
However, a final assessment of the venture capital schemes in the CEE region cannot be 
made, and the outcome of the financed companies' development cannot be assessed. The lack 
of publicity and the merely formal evaluation of the programmes does not allow for an 
objective assessment of the results. Also, the efficiency measurement for the invested budget 
resources is missing. It continues to remain questionable how successful it was, in the public 
venture capital scheme framework, more modern than earlier, in actually transforming the 
state-focused and paternalistic approach, traditional to the region, according to the new 
approach. It is still to be seen whether the governments, while investing significant public 
funds coming from EU resources, were able to give up setting excessively detailed objectives, 
and to give preferential treatment, indirectly, to fund managers and the companies to be 
financed that are loyal to them. If and when this was so in individual cases, that would mean 
hidden state aid under the cover of venture capital. This would not only be questionable from 
the market competition point of view, but would also lead to the disappearance of the 
essential feature of venture capital, i.e. providing professional support to setting up 
successful companies. 
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